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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal 
corporation of the State of 
Utah, and MURRAY CITY, a 
municipal corporation of the 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiffs and 
Respondents, 
VS 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, a body 
corporate and politic of the 
State of Utah; DELMARE L. 
LARSON, Sheriff of Salt Lake 
County; W. STERLING EVANS, 
Clerk of Salt Lake County, 
Defendants and 
Appellants. 
Case No. 14422 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFFS - DEFENDANTS 
SALT LAKE CITY, ET AL 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action initiated by Salt Lake City, et al. 
seeking to require the Salt Lake County Clerk and the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff to perform certain services as required 
by Sec. 21-7-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953), without the 
payment of fees. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. Plaintiff's -
Respondent's motion for summary judgment was granted and 
Defendant's - Appellant's was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondents' seeks affirmance of Honorable Bryant 
H. Croft's Order granting Respondents' motion for summary 
judgment. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Salt Lake County Sheriff Delmar L. Larson requested 
an opinion from Salt Lake County Attorney R. Paul Van Dam, 
interpreting Sec. 21-7-2 U.C.A. (1953). Such an opinion 
was issued September 15, 1975 which ruled that cities and 
towns were not exempt from the payment of filing and process 
fees. 
Pursuant to the County Attorney's opinion, Defendant' 
Appellant Sheriff Delmar L. Larson commenced charging municipal 
corporations for service of process in civil cases and Defendant-
Appellant W. Sterling Evans began charging municipal corporations 
for district court filing fees. 
- 2 -Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Subsequently, the Respondent, Salt Lake City, 
filed this action for a declaratory judgment. Respondent, 
Murray, City, intervened as a party plaintiff. 
- 3 -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDICIAL UTTERANCES DECLARE THAT MUNICIPALITIES ARE A 
TRADITIONAL SUBDIVISION OF THE STATE. 
Municipal corporations are traditionally declared 
subdivsions whether legal or political, of the state. 
The word municipal is derived from "munipium, 
which is a city having the right of Roman citizenship, 
governed by its own laws in respect to local affairs, but 
united to the republic by ties of sovereignity and general 
interest. 
The city as a subdivision of the state, is created 
as a convenient agency for the exercise of such of the 
governmental powers of the state as may be intrusted to it. 
This Court in 1972 reiterated this position in the case of 
Johnson vs. Sandy City Corp. In that case cities and towns 
were declared to be subdivisions of the state. 
Cities and towns traditionally perform functions of 
a dual nature: 
1. To assist the government of the State and to 
promote its general welfare; and 
1. Neuanschwander vs. Washington Sulinbar Sen. Com'n 
W~K 2d 593. 
2. City of Trenton vs. State of New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 
43 S. Ct. 534 
3. 28 U 2d 22 497 P 2d 644 
4. Id at 24 
_ 4 _ 
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2. To regulate and administer the local and internal 
5 
affairs of the territory covered by its incorporation. 
Case law is abundant to show the position that 
municipalities exist to implement statewide programs in the 
municipality. 
To adhere to Appellant's Point No. 2, which espouses 
the concept that municipal corporations are not subdivisions of 
either the state or the county, would be to ignore statutory 
and judicial utterances which comprise Utah law. 
Cities are not independant on sovereign entities. 
They are created pursuant to the state statute, which 
o 
maintains plenary contact over them after their creation. 
Municipalities have only that amount of power which state 
9 
statutes provide. 
Statutory and judicial pronouncements already show 
that municipal corporations are subdivisions of the state 
and therefor covered by the exemption provided for municipali-
ties in Sec. 21-7-2 U.C.A., 1953. 
5. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations, 
Sec 208 P. L56-147 
6. Neuenwander, supra. 
McQuillan, Sec 208 notes 4-11 and authorities cited 
therein. 
7. Chapter 2, Title 10, U.C.A. 1953. 
8. Rithaby vs. City of Salt Lake 3 Utah 2d 385, 284 P 2d 70: 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT II 
PAST AND PRESENT UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION AND STATUTES DECLARE 
CITIES TO BE SIBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 
Article XI Section 1 of the Utah Constitution 
declares that "precincts" are legal subdivisions of the 
state. 
Precints are defined by state statute in Sec. 17-16-5 
U.C.A. 1953, to include cities in which a city court exists. 
Both of the Respondants in this action provide, 
operate, and maintain city courts. Therefore, both would 
be covered by the definition of precincts as provided by the 
state statute. 
As noted in Honorable Bryant H. Crofts Memorandum, 
decision of January 2, 1976, Muntil changed by law, (cities) 
are subdivisions of the state." (emphasis ours). 
_ £ _ 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATION OF 21-7-2 BY SALT LAKE COUNTY 
OFFICIALS FOR MORE THAN SEVENTY YEARS INDICATES THAT CITIES 
ARE CONSIDERED SUBDIVISIONS OF THE STATE. 
Rules of construction adhered to in the Courts of 
this country and this state stand for the proposition that 
where an administrative interpretation is followed for 
long periods of time and generally acquiesced in, such a 
determination cannot be totally disregarded by the Courts 
except for the most compelling reasons. 
Since 1898, the administrators of the Salt Lake 
County Clerk's Office have regarded Sec. 21-7-2,.U.C.A., 1953 
as exempting cities from the payment of filing fees and 
process fees. Fore more than seventy years they have 
considered the language or subdivision thereof to Indicate 
that cities are subdivisions of the state. 
Other administrative officials of Salt Lake County 
to this date still consider cities to be exempt from the 
payment of fees. For example, the County Recorder, based 
on her interpretation of Sec. 21-7-2, U.C.A. 1953, allows 
municipalities to record all legal documents with her office 
10. Crawford, Earl Theodore, The Construction of 
Statutes, 1940, p. 393-394 
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with no fee as of the date of this brief. 
Total disregard of this long-standing administrative 
decision is not possible without the showing of compelling 
reasons. To date, no such reasons have been placed before 
this or any other court.Without such a showing, seventy 
years of administrative interpretation must be given serious 
consideration by this or any other court. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT IV 
RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION INDICATE THAT THE PHRASE 
"SUBDIVISION THEREOF11 RELATES BACK TO THE NOUN STATE. 
A. Judicial interpretation'of a statute shall be 
given its plain and obvious meaning when the statute is 
unambiguous. 
Sec. 21-7-2 U.C.A. (1953) reads as follows: 
"The state and county officers mentioned in 
this title shall not in any case perform any 
official service unless the fees prescribed 
for such service are paid in advance, and on 
such payment the oFFicer must perform the 
services required; and for every failure or 
refusal to perform official duty, when the 
fees are tendered, any officer shall be 
liable upon his official bond; provided, that 
no fees shall be charged the state, or any 
county or subdivision thereof, or any public 
officer acting therefor, or in cases of 
habeas corpus, or in criminal causes before 
final judgment, or for administering and 
certifying the oath of office, or for 
swearing pensioners and their witnesses, 
or for filing and recommending bonds for 
public officers." (Emphasis added.) 
Undisputed rules of statutory construction require 
that a statute which is unambiguous be given its plain and 
obvious meaning. 
Section 21-7-2 is clear in Its language. No doubt 
11. Flora vsU.S. 78 S.Ct. 1079 357 U.S. 63 
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or question should exist in its reading. The term "subdivision 
thereof" relates back to the noun "State" and is part of 
the list of entities which are subdivisions of the state. 
Under the "Best Antecedent Doctrine" of statutory 
construction, qualifying words, phrases, and clauses in a 
statute are applied to the words and phrases immediately 
preceeding. (emphasis added). 
This method of statutory construction clearly shows 
that "or any county or subdivision thereof is the modifier 
and refers to the noun "state." 
B. AMBIGUOUS STATUTES SHALL BE INTERPRETED ACCORDING 
TO LEGISLATIVE INTENT. 
Assuming for the sake of argument, that section 
21-7-2 U.C.A. (1953) is ambiguous the following rules of 
statutory interpretation must be applied. 
1. "In the interpretation of statutes, the 
12 
legislative will is the all-important or controlling factor." 
The Rules of Statutory Construction are designed for 
no other reason than to ascertain and declare the intention 
of the legislature. "However, since all rules for the 
interpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning have for 
their sole object the discovery of the legislative intent, 
every technical rule as to the construction of a statute 
12. Maganno Co. vs Hamilton, Wash 54 S.Ct, 599 
292 U.S. 40 
- 10 -
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must yield to the expression of the paramount will of the 
13 legislature." (Emphasis added). As stated by the 
14 United States Supreme Court in the case of Broxm v. Barry, 
"And the intention of the Legislature, when discovered, 
must prevail, any rule of construction declared by previous 
acts to the contrary notwithstanding." 
The Utah Supreme Court in Rowley v. Public Service 
15 Commission, stated it in this manner," . . . it is well to 
determine the purpose of the enactment. This is of 
importance in interpreting the act, as the purpose which 
underlies a statute is often regarded as speaking as 
plainly as the words forming the enactment.1' At the end 
of the opinion they quote Suterland on Statutory Construction, 
111
 In the exposition of a statute the intention of the 
lawmaker will prevail over the literal sense of the terms; 
and its reason and intention will prevail over the strict 
letter. When the words are not explicit the intention is 
to be collected from the context, from the occasion and 
necessity of the law; from the mischief felt, and the 
remedy in view; and the intention is to be taken or presumed 
according to what is consonant with reason and good discretion.f" 
The purpose of the Statute in question was to allow 
13. 73 Am. Jur. 2d, Sec 146 
14. 3d U.S. 365, 1 L. Ed. 638 
15. 112 U. 116, 185 P. 2d 514 (1947) 
- 11 -
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all political subdivisions of the State, free and unobstructed 
access to the Courts in all civil matters. 
2. The legislative enactment in 1898 to include 
the term "or any county, or subdivision thereof", must 
be regarded as the legislative's intent to exclude any 
city or town from the payment of filing and process fees. 
The period of seventy years is the best evidence that this 
Court could have absent an express legislative statement 
concerning its intent in amending sec. 21-7-2 U.C.A. (1953) 
in 1898. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Section 21-7-2 
Utah Code Annotated (1953) does not require state and 
county officers to collect their prescribed fees from 
cities and towns. Municipalities are exempt from the pay-
ment of such fees. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HT CRAIG HALlS^ ^ ^ ^ 
Assistant Murr^ City Attorney 
Attorney for Respondents 
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